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DESIGNING A PATTERN, DARKLY 
 
 Justin (Gus) Hurwitz *  
  
There is growing academic, regulatory, and legislative interest 
in “dark patterns”—digital design practices that influence user 
behavior in ways that may not align with users’ interests. For 
instance, websites may present information in ways that influence 
user decisions, or use design elements that make it easier for users 
to engage in one behavior (e.g., purchasing the items in a shopping 
cart) than another (e.g., reviewing the items in that shopping cart). 
The general thrust of this interest is that dark patterns are 
problematic and require regulatory or legislative action. 
While acknowledging that many concerns about dark patterns 
are legitimate, this Article discusses the more nuanced reality about 
“patterns,” that design is, simply, hard. All design influences user 
behavior, sometimes in positive ways, sometimes in negative, 
sometimes deliberately, sometimes not. This Article argues for a 
more cautionary approach to addressing the concerns of dark 
patterns. The most problematic uses of dark patterns almost 
certainly run afoul of existing consumer protection law. That 
authority––not new, broader rules—should be the first recourse to 
addressing these concerns. Beyond that, this is an area where the 
marketplace––including the design professionals working to 
improve User Interface and User Experience design practices––
should be allowed to continue to develop, but with the 
understanding that Congress and regulators have a keen interest in 
ensuring that consumer interests are reflected in those practices.  
 
 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Director of the Nebraska Governance and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
“Dark pattern” is a new term for an old practice: using design to 
prompt desired (not necessarily desirable) behavior.1 For instance, a 
website may present terms of fservice or an upgrade offer in a 
window that is more difficult to cancel than it is to accept.2 A 
                                                 
 1 DARK PATTERNS, https://www.darkpatterns.org/ [https://perma.cc/4N4F-RRPR] 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 2 Richard Thaler, The Power of Nudges, for Good and Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/upshot/the-power-of-nudges-
for-good-and-bad.html [https://perma.cc/N3E3-ST34] (discussing examples of 
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website might, possibly falsely, report to a user that many other 
users have made a similar purchase recently or that only a limited 
number of units of a product remain.3 Consumers worry that a car 
salesperson may present add-ons or upgrades at the end of a 
high-pressure negotiation, or a supermarket may stock a check-out 
aisle with high margin “impulse purchase” items.4 An employer 
might offer on-site amenities and perks that make employees 
happier, but that also result in spending more time on the job.5 
Subscription services—online and offline—may run customers 
through a “maze” of customer service representatives to cancel 
service.6 A social-media platform may make it easy and rewarding 
to uncritically “share” posts, facilitating the widespread 
dissemination of false information.7  
These practices have the potential to harm consumers. Indeed, 
some of them amount to outright fraud. Others may be prohibited by 
other laws or regulations, such as Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
                                                 
website options that defaulted to “accept” and had difficult requirements to cancel 
a subscription). 
 3 Arunesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11k 
Shopping Websites, 3 PRO. OF THE ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS 81, 
81:5 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.07032.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CTR-H259].  
 4 But see Mario J. Miranda, Determinants of Shoppers’ Checkout Behaviour at 
Supermarkets, 16 J. TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR MKTG. 312, 
319 (2008) (“[S]hoppers’ purchases at grocery checkouts may not be spontaneous 
and unreflective . . . but demonstrative of conscious concern with making efficient 
use of their shopping time. Not all purchases at checkouts can therefore be 
casually referred to as impulse purchase.”). 
 5 Mike Elgan, Latest ‘Coworking’ Services Combine Remote Offices, 
Transportation, EWEEK (May 15, 2016), https://www.eweek.com/mobile/latest-
coworking-services-combine-remote-offices-transportation 
[https://perma.cc/5B64-XS95]; Gary Anthes et al., The Right Mix, 38 
COMPUTERWORLD 24 (June 14, 2004). 
 6 THALER, supra note 2. 
 7 See Alex Kantrowitz, The Man Who Built the Retweet: “We Handed a Loaded 
Weapon to 4-Year-Olds,” BUZZFEED (July 23, 2019, 4:05 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alexkantrowitz/how-the-retweet-ruined-
the-internet [https://perma.cc/2Y7C-2LD9]; see also Soroush Vosoughi et al., The 
Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SOC. SCI. 1146 (2018). 
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Commission Act.8 Others may not run afoul of any existing law. 
Some of them may not even be all that likely to harm consumers— 
and some may even be beneficial to consumers. The ambiguity 
regarding the legality, potential harm, and possible benefits of dark 
patterns has given rise to some discussion.  
In January 2020, the author of this piece was invited to testify 
before the United States House of Representatives Energy and 
Commerce Committee’s Consumer Protection subcommittee on the 
topic of dark patterns.9 This Article revises and expands upon the 
written testimony prepared for that hearing.10 The hearing itself was 
on the topic of “manipulation and deception in the digital age,” and 
focused specifically on three topics: deep and cheap fakes 
(generally, videos manipulated to present false or misleading 
information), dark patterns (generally, interfaces designed to 
manipulate users into certain courses of conduct), and social media 
bots (generally, automated accounts on social media designed to 
produce or promote certain types of information). 
The testimony and this Article focus on dark patterns, describing 
the difficulties inherent in designing interfaces and of understanding 
the effects of design decisions as well as the risks that regulation of 
purportedly “dark” design decisions (that is, those that are harmful 
to consumers) will make all design more difficult (thereby harming 
consumers). Further, the author’s comments in both avenues also 
suggest potential regulatory tools for addressing the very real risks 
that dark patterns can pose to consumers. This Article begins in Part 
II by situating concern about dark patterns within the broader 
context of the hearing, and generally of concerns about online mis- 
                                                 
 8 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are 
hereby declared unlawful.”). 
 9 Americans at Risk: Manipulation and Deception in The Digital Age: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Com. of the Comm. on Energy and 
Com., House Comm. On Energy & Com., 116th Cong. (Jan. 8, 2020, 10:30 AM) 




 10 See id. 
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and dis-information. This discussion also reflects upon aspects of 
the hearing itself that relate to the topic––the very structure of 
Congressional hearings embeds patterns that affect their function as 
a vehicle for Congressional information gathering. Part III presents 
a general discussion of dark patterns, offering a more formal 
discussion of what they are and how the effects of design decisions 
on consumers can be bad (that is, “dark”), ambiguous, or even good. 
Part VI gets into the weeds of design, explaining the challenges of 
design in terms of the mathematical theory of complexity. And Part 
V considers approaches to addressing the concerns of dark patterns, 
from relying on competition and self-regulation, to the use of 
existing regulatory authority such as the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (“FTC”) authority to act against Unfair and 
Deceptive Acts and Practices, to more modern mechanisms such as 
using the same technological features that make dark patterns 
concerning as tools to counteract those concerns. 
II. SITUATING DARK PATTERNS IN THE PANTHEON OF 
MIS- AND DIS-INFORMATION 
Hello, ladies, look at your man, now back to me, now back at your man, 
now back to me. Sadly, he isn’t me . . . . Look down, back up, where are 
you? You’re on a boat with the man your man could smell like. What’s 
in your hand, back at me. I have it, it’s an oyster with two tickets to that 
thing you love. Look again, the tickets are now diamonds. Anything is 
possible when your man smells like Old Spice and not a lady. I’m on a 
horse. 
- The Man Your Man Could Smell Like11 
A. Dark Patterns, the Gist 
The basic idea of dark patterns is straightforward: humans are 
not perfectly rational decision-makers.12 Rather, humans constantly 
                                                 
 11 Old Spice, The Man Your Man Could Smell Like, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=owGykVbfgUE [https://perma.cc/HMR7-
GZ2T].  
 12 See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES 
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS xx (2008) (observing that “we are not only irrational, 
but predictably irrational”); RICHARD H. THALER ET AL., NUDGE: IMPROVING 
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use various heuristics to efficiently make decisions subject to 
imperfect information. These heuristics can be turned against users, 
however, and used, to some extent, to “program” them for specific 
behavior.13 
There is a myriad of common examples of these cognitive 
biases. However, dark patterns present a case where it may be easier 
to show than to tell: the images at the top of the next page 
demonstrate simple “dark patterns” at work.  
As these images demonstrate, there are patterns in how users 
interact with information. Designers study these patterns and can use 
them to present information in ways that influence how users 
respond to that information. Designers may present information in a 
manner that follows the flow of how readers or users are likely to 
naturally process it; or in a way that highlights details that may be 
easily missed; or by “hiding” information despite it being plainly 
disclosed. 
The first image14 takes advantage of how humans scan 
information in an image or on a page. In the first image, design is 
used to make the reader feel like they are being controlled by the 
image. While the presentation is in a somewhat jocular or didactic 
manner, it may nonetheless leave some readers perplexed or even 
feeling manipulated. It is, in a sense, a text-based version of the 
advertisement quoted at the beginning of this section––a popular 
advertisement for Old Spice in which the actor instructs the viewer: 
“[l]adies, look at your man, now back to me, now back at your man, 
now back to me. . . . Look down, back up, where are you? You’re 
on a boat with the man your man could smell like.”15 The design of 
that ad, both in terms of the script and the cinematography, gives the 
viewer a sense of being manipulated–again in a jocular way–that is 
                                                 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (explaining the 
nature of irrational consumers). 
 13 See THALER, supra note 12; see also BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, 
RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 11 (2018) (discussing the means by which “techno-
social engineering programs our behavior”). 
 14 Zer0Effect, And You Will Read This at the End, REDDIT (2019), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/dankmemes/comments/apcf4f/and_you_will_read_this
_at_the_end/ [https://perma.cc/3SBX-E4E9]. 
 15 Old Spice, supra note 11. 
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useful in portraying Old Spice deodorant (the product being 
advertised) as a source of confidence. 
 
 
The second image is somewhat more nefarious,16 even if 
innocuously so. It contains errors that most readers’ brains will 
automatically correct and skip over as they are read and plays with 
the reader by calling attention to these overlooked errors. Imagine 
if, instead of minor typos or grammatical errors, this image had 
“tricked” the reader into accepting substantive errors, such as the 
inclusion or omission of the word “not,” or an extra digit in the price 
of a product. Patterns like these could be used to “trick” users into 
accepting terms or disclosing information, ostensibly, knowingly. 
While there is nothing terribly new about merchants shaping the 
customer experience to their own advantage, new attention has been 
paid in recent years to practices like these when used in the online 
environment. First, given the name “dark patterns” at the beginning 
of the last decade, concern about these practices has grown in the 
academic literature and popular press in recent years.17 The 
                                                 
 16 MEMEPRO1, If You Did it Great!, REDDIT IMAGEFLIP (2018), 
https://imgflip.com/i/225k37 [https://perma.cc/DSH3-TL6Z]. 
 17 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
995, 1005 (2014); Paul Ohm, Forthright Code, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 473 (2018); 
Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 632 (2019) [hereinafter Waldman, Power]; FRISCHMANN 
& SELINGER, supra note 13. 
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phenomenon has also increasingly gained legislative attention.18 
Recently, attention has been driven particularly by concerns of the 
privacy community about the effectiveness of privacy disclosures 
and notice-and-consent requirements about mis- and dis-
information.19  
B. Dark Patterns as Mis- and Dis-information  
Dark patterns are often discussed alongside, or as a form of, 
online mis- and dis-information.20 Importantly, dark patterns are 
meaningfully different from most other forms of mis- and dis-
information––to the point that it is problematic to discuss them as 
though they were species within the same genus of concern. The 
concern about dark patterns is that firms may design websites in 
ways that adversely affect their users––that is, about manipulation 
that affects a first-party relationship. However, cheap- and 
deep-fakes, and social media bots, are designed to affect third-party 
relationships. They are intended to affect how those exposed to their 
content think about other parties of individuals––for instance, to 
embarrass a public figure or influence public debate. 
It is remarkable that these different concepts would be grouped 
together under a heading on manipulation and deception in the 
digital age. Their underlying concerns and likely policy responses 
to each share little in common. While all can colorably be 
considered under a common rubric of manipulation and 
disinformation, grouping these concepts in this way suggests a 
greater similarity between them than really exists. Grouping 
                                                 
 18 See, e.g., Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act (DETOUR 
Act), S.1084, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 19 See Waldman, Power, supra note 17; Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of 
Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239, 1247 (2019); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in 
Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries 42 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1057, 1071 (2019); Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The 
Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2019); Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz & Jamie Luguri, Consumertarian Default Rules, 82 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 154 (2019); Ohm, supra note 17; Lauren E. Willis, Why 
not Privacy by Default, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 68 (2014); FRISCHMANN & 
SELINGER, supra note 13. 
 20 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9 (discussing dark patterns alongside other 
topics such as cheap and deep fakes). 
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concepts such as deep fakes and dark patterns together could itself 
be considered a form of manipulation or deception, using the 
concerns raised by each to create a greater specter of concern than 
would otherwise exist. 
C. The Curious Case of Congressional Testimony 
As noted above, the origin of this Article was Congressional 
testimony on the general topic of “manipulation and deception in the 
digital age.” It is worth reflecting on the spectacle of Congressional 
testimony itself as a useful lens for thinking about dark patterns. The 
observation above, that the structure of the hearing at which the 
earlier version of this Article was presented––the artificial grouping 
of three distinct forms of potentially problematic online conduct 
under a unified heading of manipulation and deception––could itself 
be considered a form of manipulation or deception leads to some 
broader reflections on the nature of the Subcommittee hearing 
process. The entire structure of Congressional testimony is designed 
to elicit certain types of discussion. It would take a special sort of 
naiveté to believe the purpose of a hearing is to provide useful 
information to Congress or to engage in a probing search for truth. 
To the contrary, the structure of the hearing, in which each 
participant is given short windows in which to either make 
statements or ask questions, all but makes it impossible for any issue 
to be explored in detail or any ideas to be interrogated in depth. 
Rather, the nature of the Congressional hearing is performative, 
providing each member a five-minute opportunity for structured 
colloquy with the witnesses.21 This time may be used in various 
ways, from making statements to dialoguing with individual 
witnesses, or asking the entire panel of witnesses to respond––
typically with a yes or no answer––to a question. In any event, the 
game is obvious to those who have played it: each member of 
                                                 
 21 As recently explained by a United States Senator: “Most of what happens in 
committee hearings isn’t oversight, it’s showmanship. Senators make speeches 
that get chopped up, shipped to home-state TV stations, and blasted across social 
media. They aren’t trying to learn from witnesses, uncover details, or improve 
legislation. They’re competing for sound bites.” Ben Sasse, Make the Senate 
Great Again, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/make-the-senate-great-
again-11599589142 [https://perma.cc/UNC2-GZ7X]. 
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Congress comes to a hearing with their own agenda, and the hearing 
provides them an opportunity to introduce materials into the 
record—be it the written record or the recorded video––in support 
of that agenda. 
Hearings need not be designed this way. When Congress, either 
as individual members or an institution, wants to learn about a topic, 
it has better mechanisms than the public spectacle of a hearing. The 
purpose of a public hearing is precisely the spectacle of the thing––
the opportunity it creates for grandstanding, creating soundbites, and 
prompting useful statements from Congressionally-certified 
experts. To this end, they are deliberately designed to be amenable 
to this purpose. 
The foregoing aspects of a Congressional hearing’s design 
makes testifying in a hearing about dark patterns––and, for that 
matter, mis- and dis-information generally––a curiously ironic 
experience. Throughout the hearing, it was unclear whether those in 
the room could tell how often the discussion addressed the patterns 
that were on display in real time. 
Perhaps the greatest irony of the hearing, however, related to the 
topic of cheap fakes. Cheap fakes generally refer to videos edited to 
present the source material to portray a narrative different from the 
original source content. For instance, a video in which content is 
selectively edited, or the way in which it is played back is altered, 
would be a cheap fake. Examples such as using out-of-context 
excerpts from a recording of presidential candidate’s town hall, or 
altering the playback-speed of a recording to make the speaker 
sound intoxicated, are demonstrations of cheap fakes.22 So too is 
altering portions of a video to change its apparent meaning.23 
At the beginning of her questioning of witnesses, Subcommittee 
Chairwoman Jan Schakowsky referenced her questioning of Mark 
Zuckerberg at a prior hearing, noting that “when we had Mark 
Zuckerberg here, I did a review of all of the apologies we have had 
                                                 
 22 @ubermomocmd, TWITTER (May 23, 2019, 6:25 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
ubermomocmd/status/1131521526212243457 [https://perma.cc/JW79-M6ZQ]. 
 23 See @shaderunnr, TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2020, 12:13 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
shaderunnr/status/1215335927511425024 [https://perma.cc/B3D5-YF6A]. 
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from him over the years.”24 Had this reference been presented as a 
video compilation of various times in which Mr. Zuckerberg 
apologized, it would be a canonical example of a cheap fake. Indeed, 
such video compilations exist, and have been aired as part of news 
programs.25 
The point of this discussion is not to criticize or express concern 
about the Subcommittee or its hearing process. To the contrary, the 
hearing process serves valuable purposes. And while hearings may 
not be particularly effective tools for information discovery, they are 
nonetheless important tools for incorporating information into the 
democratic process. The lesson from this discussion is that dark 
patterns––as well as other tools that can be associated with mis- or 
dis-information––can, in fact, serve valuable informational 
purposes. And more poignantly, that before Congress decides to 
regulate the speech practices of others, it would be advised to look 
to its own practices for guidance. 
III. DARK PATTERNS: DEFINING THE CONCERN 
A. What are Dark Patterns? 
First coined in 2010,26 the term “dark patterns” was created to 
describe user interface design patterns that are “crafted with great 
attention to detail, and a solid understanding of human psychology, 
to trick users into do[ing] things they wouldn’t otherwise have 
done.”27 
The term is used primarily to describe user interface design 
choices intended to invoke a particular behavior (usually to the 
benefit of the designer and/or the designer’s employer). Many, if not 
most, examples have offline analogs. But the arguably unique thing 
                                                 
 24 Hearings, supra note 9 (testimony of Monika Bickert). 
 25 CBS This Morning, Timeline of Mark Zuckerberg’s Apologies, YOUTUBE (Apr. 
11, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHah9agzXfs [https://perma.cc/8BZL-
5S32]. 
 26 Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Dirty Tricks Designers Use to Make People 
Do Stuff, 90 PERCENT OF EVERYTHING (July 8, 2010), https://www. 
90percentofeverything.com/2010/07/08/dark-patterns-dirty-tricks-designers-use-
to-make-people-do-stuff/ [https://perma.cc/T8KY-PRVC]. 
 27 Id. 
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about dark patterns is that software interfaces to online platforms are 
infinitely and instantly malleable. There is practically no limit to 
design choices, and those design choices can be changed, tweaked, 
updated, and targeted with ease––including in real-time and in 
response to specific users or user actions. The limitations of dark 
patterns online are inherently different from those in more 
traditional sales channels. For instance, a supermarket checkout 
aisle needs to be roughly a constant size, needs to target the average 
customer insofar as is impracticable to send customers to different 
aisles based on, e.g., their buying history, can only fit so many 
products on the shelves, and cannot be easily changed outside of a 
set schedule. 
Another unique aspect of dark patterns is that, sometimes, the 
underlying code is available. So, for instance, if a webpage is 
targeting different interfaces to different users using browser-side 
techniques, the underlying code can be inspected. Similarly, online 
interfaces are typically used from the relative comfort of one’s home 
or office, or while out and about on one’s mobile device. Both of 
these factors give users greater control over how they choose to 
interact with an interface than is possible in many offline settings. 
Dark patterns take advantage of a few key behaviors of 
imperfectly rational humans. First, people are unwilling to devote a 
large amount of cognitive resources to relatively low value 
activities. As such, people skim when they read, often missing some 
details—particularly those that may be designed in a way that makes 
them relatively easier to miss. People’s eyes follow common 
patterns when reading text on a screen or page, as a result of how 
salient information has been presented in their prior experiences.28 
Second, if there is a cost to correct a mistake, people may just accept 
the mistake if the cost in time or effort exceeds the cost of continuing 
on their present course. Few people will take the time to return a 
product for a $2.00 refund, even if that product was shipped to them 
(and they were charged for it) in error (or fraud). Third, people are 
social creatures and frequently rely on the behavior of others to 
                                                 
 28 A search on Amazon.com for books on “eye tracking,” for instance, yields 
dozens of results. Results for “Eye Tracking,” AMAZON, https://www. 
amazon.com/s?k=eye+tracking&ref=nb_sb_noss_2 (last visited Aug. 22, 2020). 
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guide their own conduct. Thus, when presented with information 
such as “Bonnie in New Jersey recently purchased item X” or “12 
other people are looking at this deal right now,” consumers will 
potentially feel an elevated sense of pressure to commit to a 
purchase. This heuristic, sometimes referred to as “social proof,” 
can be understood as entirely rational, reflecting the wisdom of the 
crowd; but it can also be taken advantage of to present a decision as 
more desirable than it really is.29 
There is no doubt that firms use dark patterns, or that they can 
be effective. One recent study analyzed 53,000 different product 
pages across 11,000 different online shopping sites, and found 1,818 
instances of dark pattern usage.30 In another study, respondents 
presented with either a “mild” or “aggressive” dark pattern designed 
to push them into purchasing credit monitoring services were 228% 
to 371% more likely to purchase the offered services.31 
At the same time, and as discussed below, design is, simply put, 
hard, and not all “dark” patterns are intentional or malicious. Some 
are benign or even beneficial.32 Design decisions are necessary to 
any interface and negative effects may be inadvertent or practicably 
unavoidable. For example, one of the studies above used screen 
shots from the PlayStation live service and its promotion of a 
12-month subscription over the 1-month option by using larger text 
for the former to demonstrate a deceptive dark pattern.33 But, 
considering the large volume of gamers that use that service, it may 
                                                 
 29 See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PERSUASION (Harper Bus. rev. ed. 2006). Indeed, the term “social proof,” is 
generally traced to Robert Cialdini’s 1984 book INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF PERSUASION, one of the seminal books on the psychology of persuasion and 
marketing. 
 30 Mathur, supra note 3. 
 31 Jamie Luguri & Lior Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns 22 (Univ. 
of Chic. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 719, 2019), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3431205 [https://perma.cc/P2NA-CLJP]. 
 32 See Jonathan Cribb & Carl Emmerson, What Happens When Employers Are 
Obliged to Nudge? Automatic Enrolment and Pension Savings in the UK 34 (Inst. 
Fiscal Stud., Working Paper No. 1619, 2016), https://www.ifs.org.uk/ 
uploads/wp1619.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDN3-MUJB] (finding that automatic 
enrollment in pension programs lead to large increases in savings by employees). 
 33 See Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 31, at 13–17. 
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simply be the case that the annual savings and convenience of not 
having to subscribe monthly benefits one group of users, even 
though it may be annoying or undesirable to a second set of users. 
In other words, using larger text sizes to make the option most 
desired by most users easier to find, while leaving the alternate 
option available on the same page for users who prefer it, may be 
the preferred design for most users. Further, designs intended to 
bring about certain effects may be ineffective, and intended effects 
may be beneficial––for example, reminding users of abandoned 
shopping carts and reminding users of necessary complementary 
products may confer a benefit on both the seller (more sales) and the 
buyer (purchasing desired products). It may be the case that the 
annoyance of being “pushed” to purchase items in a cart, or to buy 
items related to those in a cart, is relatively minor, even spread 
across thousands of users, to avoid a greater inconvenience for users 
who fail to click the final button to complete a purchase, or who are 
about to purchase a product only to later discover that they needed 
to have purchased complementary goods to use it. 
Dark patterns are also nothing new. Indeed, most have existed 
in one form or another in the offline world for a long time. Stores 
keep candy near registers because it is easier for parents to simply 
placate a whining child than to discipline them in a checkout aisle. 
Similarly, tabloids art kept near registers to entertain customers and 
distract them from the feeling of impatience while waiting to pay. 
When purchasing a car at a dealership, the salesperson may 
“consult” with a hidden “manager” to make a customer feel he is 
getting a good deal. The customer then frequently needs to go 
through two or three layers of personnel to finalize the deal, each 
time being offered various “upgrades” to the vehicle being 
purchased. Homeowners needing contractors for home remodeling, 
fence installation, or a major repair will frequently not be able to 
receive a price over the phone—even if pricing is relatively 
standard—because such companies prefer to send a salesperson to 
the premises who can talk the potential customer through objections. 
These are all common “tricks” of the sales trade. These tricks 
are patterns of doing business that allow firms to generate more 
revenue from customers. In some cases, these tricks may be 
deceptive or harmful, or at least have no positive social value (as 
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opposed to merely transferring wealth from customer to firm). In 
other cases, there may be real value to these tricks. A company may 
prefer to send contractors to visit customers’ homes because 
experience shows customers often do not understand which products 
best suit their needs, or have the wrong work done on their houses 
to solve a given problem. Sending the contractor to inspect the job 
site before giving a quote may allow for better quotes and 
performance and, even more importantly, avoids creating unhappy, 
or complaining, customers. And in other cases, these tricks may be 
a mechanism for price discrimination—sorting customers by their 
willingness to pay for a given product. While controversial, the 
economics of price discrimination are widely understood and, 
generally, legal. The net effect of price discrimination in 
competitive markets generally does not increase firm revenues 
significantly. Rather, by charging some customers more and keeping 
the average price the same, firms are able to offer other customers 
lower prices, which can allow them to offer their goods or services 
to consumers who may otherwise be priced out of the market. 
B. Dark Patterns: the Good, the Bad, and the Ambiguous34 
Although the literature on dark patterns is relatively new, there 
are some readily identifiable patterns which deserve discussion. 
What follows is a discussion of some of these common patterns, and 
an attempt to differentiate them, along with other examples in terms 
of “good,” “bad” and “ambiguous” effects. 
1. Bad-effect Design 
Websites may use designs to trick consumers into undesired 
action. These designs include, for instance, employing things such 
as “countdown timers”35 indicating that a customer only has “X” 
amount of time remaining to complete a purchase. Using fraudulent 
information, website designs may create a needless sense of urgency 
that compels a customer to make a purchase that they would not 
have made upon less pressured reflection. Sites also employ a 
                                                 
 34 Note, these “bad/ambiguous/good” behavior headings are approximate, 
meant to offer intuitive examples to demonstrate that design can be good or bad. 
 35 Mathur et al., supra note 3, at 8:12. 
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“limited-time message” or “scarcity message”36 indicating that a 
particular deal will only exist for a short period of time, or that the 
item is on the verge of selling out. When fraudulent, the artificial 
urgency created by countdown timers and similar features is used to 
motivate a buyer without need. Upsells, a design that introduces 
steps meant to encourage users to purchase an additional good or 
service (e.g. insurance for a travel ticket), are also common. When 
a design “confirmshames”37 users, it employs a choice interface 
(“yes” or “no”) in a way that manipulates a consumer’s emotions. 
Thus, instead of just allowing a “no” choice to decline optional 
insurance for a vacation, the offered choice may be “No, I don’t 
want to protect my valuables and loved ones during my trip.” 
Visual interference38 is used to display important text in 
obscured or otherwise difficult to see color and layout scheme.39 
One-way visual interference manifests online is to offer users 
upgrade options in a window that offers them an obvious way to 
accept, but obscures how to decline, the offer. The cognitive effect 
of this design is that it gives users inclined to decline the offer a few 
additional seconds to change their minds, and, because people have 
a natural predisposition to ideas that they have encountered recently, 
the design may in fact make these users marginally more likely to 
do so. Even if the conversion rate is small, if offered immediately 
after a sale, this mechanism only has upside revenue potential. 
More traditionally, supermarkets manage the length of lines to 
generate a sunk-cost bias. Also, as noted above, impulse buy items 
                                                 
 36 Id. at 8:16–17. 
 37 Id. at 8:17. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Kaitlyn Tiffany, This Instagram Story Ad with a Fake Hair in it is Sort 
of Disturbing, THE VERGE (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/ 
tldr/2017/12/11/16763664/sneaker-ad-instagram-stories-swipe-up-trick [https:// 
perma.cc/ M7LQ-ABVC]. Note, however, that deceptively obtained consent is 
ineffective. At times, this pattern goes beyond simple design choices in terms of 
font and color, and moves into introducing wholly out of place elements clearly 
meant to confuse a user. For example, one shoe retailer placed a picture of a hair 
over top of their otherwise legitimate ad in an effort to trick users into swiping up. 
Id. Some users, thinking they were ridding their screen of a hair, actually ended 
up on the retailer’s website. Id. 
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are offered alongside the waiting shoppers to encourage them to add 
more to their order. Sites sometimes use “sneaking,”40 which 
automatically adds items to a shopper’s cart. One of the most classic 
examples of off-line manipulative behavior is creating roadblocks 
for users to shape their behavior. Typically, these roadblocks take 
the form of making it difficult to cancel a service or return a product. 
For example, cancelling cell phone service frequently requires 
transfers between multiple sales representatives and navigation of 
complex phone menus. Cancelling cable or internet services often 
requires consumers to go through a similarly circuitous experience. 
2. Ambiguous-effect Design 
There are a host of behaviors that arguably straddle the line 
between benign and unsavory. Websites frequently employ 
automated messaging systems that periodically remind browsing 
customers of items they left in their carts. Technically unsolicited, 
messages such as these may be an annoyance, but may also serve to 
remind users of purchases that they want to return to or even thought 
that they had completed. Complementary product notices are 
similar. To some users, being offered complementary products may 
be an annoyance or even induce undesired purchases, but for others 
they can provide important information and avoid substantial future 
costs. For instance, a site may suggest a customer who is buying a 
plumbing fixture also buy Teflon plumbing tape. If the customer is 
unaware that Teflon plumbing tape is needed to properly install most 
fixtures, this is valuable information that may save the consumer 
from having to make a subsequent purchase, or even from 
improperly installing the fixture. On the other hand, if the customer 
already has such tape, this may be a minor annoyance. Further, if the 
suggested product is not actually needed, this suggestion may be 
harmful to the customer. 
Grocery stores use inconsistent labeling on the price stickers 
placed on goods––similar items may have their unit prices 
calculated using different units.41 Inconsistent labeling can be 
                                                 
 40 Id. 
 41 Melanie Pinola, How the Unit Pricing Labels in Stores Can Trick You into 
Spending More, LIFEHACKER (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:00 A.M.), https://lifehacker.com/ 
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misleading (making more expensive products appear less 
expensive), or just irritating, as it forces consumers to do their own 
comparisons and makes pure price competition among vendors 
more difficult. Some argue that inconsistent labeling is a devious 
mechanism forcing consumers into buying more expensive products 
by making it harder for customers to identify which products have 
the best prices. It can, however, also be a way of promoting 
non-price competition, where consumers are unlikely to compare 
the quality of products if their sole focus is price. Indeed, research 
suggests that consumers may over-rely on price comparisons as 
strong indicators of quality.42  
Doctors, dentists, and similar healthcare providers increasingly 
insist upon scheduling follow-up appointments at the beginning of 
an appointment. Requesting that patients schedule follow-ups before 
their initial appointment may pressure patients into scheduling 
appointments that they do not need, or more often than they need. 
These appointments may even be decided based upon what a 
patient’s insurance will cover, not what the patient needs from a 
medical or professional perspective––a practice that may increase 
overall healthcare costs for everyone in society. On the other hand, 
this practice may also make it more likely that needed follow-up 
appointments are scheduled, which may be better for patients, 
reduce providers’ administrative costs, and reduce overall 
healthcare costs for society. It is possible that on average, some 
portion of such appointments are wasteful or beneficial—but in any 
given case the effects may be either beneficial or harmful. 
Arguably, even familiar and widely used user interface elements 
such as a “like” button or a “retweet” button represent a degree of 
user manipulation, albeit with ambiguous effects. Social networks 
are today defined, to some extent, on the degree of reach that 
individual users can affect. Much of this reach is measured by user 
                                                 
how-the-unit-pricing-labels-in-stores-can-trick-you-int-1641793755 [https://perma.cc/ 
K3KZ-5GDF]. 
 42 Dengfeng Yan et al., Package Size and Perceived Quality: The Intervening 
Role of Unit Price Perception, 24 J. OF CONSUMER PSYCH. 3, 14 (2014) (finding 
that consumers use unit price as a proxy to determine quality when comparing 
similarly sized and different sized goods). 
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engagement, which is, in turn, driven by activities such as liking and 
retweeting.43 These design features were explicit choices meant to 
encourage user interaction on the social networks, and thus represent 
user manipulation to a degree. The social value of these platforms is 
subject to important debate and scrutiny, from their ability to serve 
as vectors for and amplifiers of mis- and dis-information and 
concerns about potentially addictive behavior patterns.44 
Nonetheless, social media has unquestionably been beneficial to 
many in society––most often to minority and other disadvantaged 
voices that have historically not had access to high-profile 
platforms. For those voices, social media has served as a significant 
amplifier of their messages, concerns, and ideas—and the design 
elements that have allowed these platforms to succeed have allowed 
these user groups to benefit from them. 
Or, to return to an echo of the PlayStation example used above, 
during its regular membership drive, NPR strongly encourages 
listeners to become “sustaining members.” That is, NPR wants 
listeners to agree to small, automatic, monthly donations instead of 
larger, one-time donations. But why should NPR care if a listener 
gives $120 once in January or $10 per month over a period of twelve 
months? The answer is that this encouragement is a dark pattern.45 
Getting listeners to sign up for the monthly subscription makes it 
more likely that they will continue paying long into the future. 
Rather than hoping that each year the listener will affirmatively 
choose to make a single large donation, the psychological burden is 
                                                 
 43 Jeffrey Kranz, 7 Social Media Engagement Metrics for Tracking Followers 
and Growing Community, BUFFER (Sept. 21, 2015), https://buffer.com/resources/ 
measure-social-media-engagement [https://perma.cc/PZ5H-FAKU]. 
 44 See Christian Montag et al., Addictive Features of Social Media/Messenger 
Platforms and Freemium Games against the Background of Psychological and 
Economic Theories, 16 INT’L. J. ENVTL. RSCH. PUB. HEALTH 2612, 2623 (2019); 
Hilary Andersson, Social Media Apps are ‘Deliberately’ Addictive to Users, BBC 
NEWS (July 3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44640959 
[https://perma.cc/RHY4-FQWB]. 
 45 See Priscella Esser, Getting Users’ Long-Term Commitment with a Monthly 
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shifted to the listener to discontinue making small regular donations, 
which many are unlikely to do. NPR, of course, is a good, honest, 
hardworking news organization with pure motives, so it would never 
be criticized for taking advantage of its listeners by tricking them 
into emptying their pocketbooks into public broadcasting’s coffers. 
But when companies like Microsoft and Adobe use this same 
practice,46 it is clearly deceptive. 
3. Good-effect Design 
Design choices can also obviously be aimed toward good ends. 
Apple and Amazon are two of the best examples of carefully 
considered design meant to drive positive user experiences. The 
so-called “Apple tax,” the price premium that Apple is able to 
charge for its products compared to similar-quality products from 
other companies, is a reflection of Apple’s reputation for producing 
well-designed products.47 Amazon, likewise, to an important degree 
made e-commerce accepted and trusted through the great strides it 
made in both creating secure environments that customers could 
trust, and in removing as much of the friction in the shopping 
experience as possible. Its famous “1-click” patent, and the 
associated ease with which it designed its checkout experience, was 
an important part of that innovation.48 
Individual apps that cater to different user lifestyles also 
introduce design choices—often using the same techniques derided 
as manipulative in the social media context—to encourage, for 
example, healthier lifestyles. Apple’s watch has a built-in app that 
reminds users to breathe deeply periodically,49 and an app that 
                                                 
 46 Id. Lest the dripping irony be lost, the effects of these practices in the cases 
of both NPR and commercial entities like Microsoft and Adobe are ambiguous, 
with both positive and negative effects for different groups of users. 
 47 Kevin Downey, Why are Apple Products so Friggin’ Expensive?, 
KIMKOMANDO (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.komando.com/money-tips/why-are-
apple-products-so-friggin-expensive/549472/ [https://perma.cc/L89X-GLUM]. 
 48 Why Amazon’s ‘1-Click’ Ordering Was a Game Changer, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 14, 2017), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn. 
edu/article/amazons-1-click-goes-off-patent/# [https://perma.cc/86R6-38QN]. 
 49 Lucy Hattersley, What is Breath for Apple Watch ǀ How to use Apple Breathe 
app in watchOS3, MACWORLD (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.macworld.co.uk/ 
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reminds users to stand up and walk around once an hour to combat 
the problems associated with modern work habits.50 Other apps help 
dieters remember when they are allowed to eat, encourage them to 
make healthier choices, and to drink enough water. 
IV. THE DARK TRUTH: DESIGN IS HARD 
Design is difficult. It is also necessary. A car must have a 
mechanism for steering, which must be located somewhere and be 
articulated in a certain manner. Design choices will affect how easy 
it is to operate the car, how responsive the car is to the driver and to 
road conditions, and how safely the car can be operated. Design 
decisions will affect the aesthetics of the car, how comfortable the 
car is, and the cost of manufacturing the car. Indeed, the decision of 
whether to invest significantly in research and development relating 
to the car’s steering mechanisms will affect the cost, quality, and 
safety of the car. 
Things just get more complicated from there. If regulators want 
to ensure the safety of cars, they need to design systems for 
measuring, monitoring, and enforcing safety metrics. If, for 
instance, regulators use crash test dummies modeled after the typical 
male driver, car manufacturers will design cars that are safe for 
typical male drivers––and possibly unsafe for female drivers.51 
Design, in other words, is difficult.  
A. . . . it’s Complicated 
In some systems, including nearly all software-based systems, 
design is more than just difficult, it is “complicated.” Complex 
systems are systems with many interconnected parts, in which 
changes to any one of those parts can affect other parts, often in 
                                                 
feature/iphone/what-is-breathe-for-apple-watch-how-use-apple-breathe-app-in-
watchos-3-3643692/ [https://perma.cc/FBD4-V8C7]. 
 50 Close Your Rings, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/watch/close-your-rings/ 
[https://perma.cc/47NB-7F7R] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020). 
 51 This is a topic that has been discussed extensively in recent years. See, e.g., 
Astrid Linder & Mats Svensson, Road Safety: The Average Male as a Norm in 
Vehicle Occupant Crash Safety Assessment, 44 INTERDISC. SCI. REVS. 140, 140 
(2019). 
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unexpected and hard to understand ways. The measure of 
complexity in these systems is said to grow polynomially, 
exponentially, or even factorially in proportion to the total number 
of components in the system.52 In other words, doubling the number 
of components in a system from five to ten may increase the overall 
complexity––the possible number of interactions between those 
components––by a factor of over 30,000.53 
One of the primary goals of “design” is to reduce complexity. 
Complexity is primarily controlled by reducing the number of 
possible interactions between the components of a system––and 
this, in turn, means reducing the overall functionality of the system. 
The challenge is figuring out which functionality to excise and 
which to retain. Sometimes, reducing overall system complexity can 
even entail adding new components. For instance, a system can be 
designed with a “basic” or “default” mode in which users cannot 
change most settings, but can also have an additional “advanced” 
mode in which users have greater control. Designing such a system 
requires developing two separate interfaces, a way to switch 
between them, and user education on this multi-interface system. 
Complexity abounds, often with tragic results. The Three Mile 
Island disaster is a classic example––perhaps the most famous. As 
described by the Washington Post following the disaster, “[t]he 
[Three Mile Island] control room is a vision from science fiction. It 
sits under the shadow of the 190-foot-high domed reactor 
containment building. Inside, a horseshoe-shaped panel stretches 40 
feet along three walls lined with dials, gauges and 1,200 warning 
lights color-coded red and green.”54 All of those dials, gauges, and 
warning lights were working well when the disaster occurred. They 
presented, however, too much information to be useful, and did so 
in a way that could not be useful, in the event of a real-time 
                                                 
 52 See Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws, 49 
RUTGERS L. REV 403, 431 (1997) (providing an overview of the concept of 
computational complexity). 
 53 Id. at 435–36 (giving a similar example that demonstrates exponential and 
factorial growth). 
 54 A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/ch1.htm [https://perma.cc/4FUR-HYJE]. 
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emergency. Subsequent investigation determined that the indicator 
light for the pump responsible for the chain of events that led to the 
eventual disaster communicated ambiguous information that misled 
the facility staff as they tried to figure out why the power plant was 
malfunctioning. 55 As Don Norman, Emeritus Professor and Director 
of the University of California San Diego Design Lab explained: 
“[t]he control room and computer interfaces at Three Mile Island 
could not have been more confusing if they had tried.”56 
The August 21, 2017 collision of the Navy destroyer John S. 
McCain presents a more recent, and more poignantly tragic, 
example of the complexity and stakes of design decisions. The 
National Transportation Safety Board’s (“NTSB”) report on that 
incident identifies “the design of the destroyer’s Integrated Bridge 
and Navigation System” (“IBNS”) as one of the factors contributing 
to the collision, and finds that “the design of the John S. McCain’s 
touch-screen steering and thrust control system increased the 
likelihood of the operator errors that led to the collision.”57 
Moreover, the report focuses extensively on issues relating to 
operational procedures and crew training that are directly related to 
the design of the IBNS.58 As documented in a subsequent ProPublica 
report, the IBNS design failures eerily echo the design failures at 
Three Mile Island: an easily-overlooked pop-up window indicated 
which station had steering and thrust control at any given time.59 In 
a more modern twist, the use of touch-screens added additional 
                                                 
 55 Pulkit Verma, 3 Button Designs from 3 Different Decades That Almost 
Results in Catastrophe, UX COLLECTIVE (Oct. 18, 2019), https://uxdesign.cc/3-
button-designs-from-3-different-decades-that-almost-results-in-catastrophe-
9ac65498c9c4 [https://perma.cc/Z57C-7GWY]. 
 56 Id. 
 57 NAT’L. TRANSP. SAFETY BD., MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/MAR-1901 
COLLISION BETWEEN US NAVY DESTROYER JOHN S MCCAIN AND TANKER ALNIC MC 
SINGAPORE STRAIT, 5 MILES NORTHEAST OF HORSBURGH LIGHTHOUSE 33 (2019), 
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1901.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3EF-H6SV] [hereinafter NTSB]. 
 58 Id. at 33–34. 
 59 See T. Christian Miller et al., Collision Course, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://features.propublica.org/navy-uss-mccain-crash/navy-installed-touch-
screen-steering-ten-sailors-paid-with-their-lives/ [https://perma.cc/ND76-BNAB].  
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complexity. As noted by the NTSB report, “the touch-screen throttle 
controls deprived the lee helmsman of tactile feedback when the 
throttles were unganged and mismatched,” which was likely another 
contributing factor to the incident.60 
Both of these tragedies are examples of “normal accidents” ––a 
term first coined by Charles Perrow.61 The core of Perrow’s insight 
into “normal accidents” is that they are an inevitable part of any 
sufficiently complex, tightly coupled system. Perrow specifically 
considered the potential for these accidents in systems with a high 
catastrophic potential––Three Mile Island was his motivating 
example––to argue that society must either accept the inevitable 
tragedies that accompany complex systems such as these or abandon 
them. His basic insight, that complex systems will behave in 
unpredictable and at times undesirable ways and that their creators 
cannot design this characteristic out of them, generalizes across any 
complex system. 
Almost all software is a complex system, subject to the analysis 
above. Consider, alone, the challenges that websites face in 
standardizing their user interface across different web browsers and 
operating systems. Although the problem is less severe now due to 
browsers relying on more standardized rendering engines, for the 
first decade or two of the world wide web, it was a common 
phenomenon for a website to only work well on one browser and 
one operating system (typically Windows with Internet Explorer). 
Websites functioning only on certain browsers and operating 
systems was not the result of a nefarious plan on the part of web 
developers, but was, rather, the result of developers making design 
decisions under imperfect conditions.62 The rendering engines of 
different browsers often made it difficult to perfectly render the 
same user interface in the same manner across every browser and 
                                                 
 60 NTSB, supra note 57, at 33. 
 61 CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK 
TECHNOLOGIES 5 (Princeton Univ. Press rev. ed. 2011). 
 62 See Tom Warren, Chrome is Turning into the New Internet Explorer 6, THE 
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operating system combination.63 Thus, websites frequently would 
have problems with certain sections not rendering correctly, 
functionality missing, or scripts not executing as expected. 
With the entrance of mobile phones and tablets, the problem has 
been made more complicated. Designers now face the challenge of 
designing interfaces to run on multiple browsers running on multiple 
classes of devices with dramatically different user interfaces—both 
in terms of display and input––across desktops, laptops, tablets, and 
phones. Sometimes, firms have the resources to customize their 
interfaces for many combinations of devices and browsers, but this 
is often not the case. Thus, designers create interfaces that attempt 
to average out the differences across device and browser 
combinations or choose to focus on certain more popular or 
higher-value combination to the exclusion of others.64 These 
concerns are compounded by the presence of different types of 
users––both in terms of soft characteristics like preferences and 
harder characteristics like age and disability. 
It is nigh impossible to design an interface that accommodates 
any given set of user preferences and system requirements perfectly. 
Additionally, the more variables that designers try to accommodate, 
the more complex the system becomes—with the result that the 
better a job a designer tries to do in delivering a satisfactory 
experience to all users, the more likely it becomes that the system 
will fail catastrophically. 
Of course, the degree of catastrophe between Three Mile Island 
and a website recommending the wrong product to a shopper is not 
truly comparable. It is nonetheless the case, though, that the 
underlying causes of many seemingly “dark patterns” may be as 
innocent and inevitable as the Three Mile Island accident. 
                                                 
 63 Marco Tabini, Why Some Websites Don’t Work Properly in Your Favorite 
Browser, MACWORLD (Jan. 10, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.macworld. 
com/article/2023682/why-some-websites-dont-work-properly-in-your-favorite-
browser.html [https://perma.cc/4HQF-U58D]. 
 64 See CLAIRE ROWLAND ET AL., DESIGNING CONNECTED PRODUCTS: UX FOR 
THE CONSUMER INTERNET OF THINGS 337 (2015) (“In systems where functionality 
and interactions are distributed across more than one device, it’s not enough to 
design individual UIs in isolation. Designers need to create a coherent UX across 
all the devices with which the user interacts.”). 
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However, the sometimes-innocuous nature of dark patterns is 
not to excuse the myriad of truly inexcusable deceptive dark patterns 
that many firms unquestionably use. A firm that programs its system 
to provide false information to a user knowing that the user may act 
upon that information is not an example of a normal accident, or the 
sort of design mishap that results from the complex nature of 
systems. On the other hand, this example is a cautionary story about 
inserting regulators or regulation into the design process. Such 
regulatory intervention increases complexity, sometimes 
dramatically. Importantly, the potential for added complexity due to 
regulation is not a reason to avoid design-related regulation—it is, 
however, a reason to regulate cautiously and narrowly. 
B. . . . it’s Unpredictable 
Another challenge of design is that its effects can be 
unpredictable. Design choices are intended to affect how human 
actors interact with a system—but the human-design interface is not 
mechanistic. Humans are not simple machines that respond in a 
predictable, linear way to design choices on an interface. Rather, 
humans are intelligent agents. Design choices present users with 
information in different ways, and they make, more or less, 
informed decisions based upon this information. Sometimes these 
decisions are surprising; often they are unpredictable. 
Efforts to use “nudges” to encourage individuals to register as 
organ donors demonstrate one category of examples of this 
unpredictability.65 Following the popularization of nudges in the 
2000s, regulators around the world began experimenting with how 
to use them to implement public policy. One such public policy was 
organ donor registration. The U.K. government studies the 
effectiveness of using nudges to encourage individuals to register as 
organ donors through its Behavioral Insights Team. This Team 
attempted to increase organ donor registration using several 
different nudges. “None of these approaches was as successful as 
                                                 
 65 See Tim Harford, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 
21, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/9d7d31a4-aea8-11e3-aaa6-00144feab7de 
[https://perma.cc/A2Q3-4CT8]. 
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the best alternatives at persuading people to sign up.”66 Indeed, one 
of the approaches—using a photograph that illustrated the value of 
organ donation—actually decreased organ donor registrations.67 
There has been similar study of using the design of cigarette 
packaging to deter smoking. One of the most commonly studied 
design is the use of Graphic Warning Labels (“GWLs”) on 
packaging to deter smokers. Here, too, the effects have been mixed. 
Some studies, for instance, demonstrate that GWLs produce no 
effect on purchasers of cigarettes, including among daily-, 
occasional-, and non-smokers,68 and may even increase daily- and 
occasional smokers’ positive attitudes towards smoking.69 Studies 
also show that these warnings may decrease the likelihood of 
nonsmokers taking up smoking.70 Perhaps most tellingly, some of 
these studies show that non-smokers and smokers have different 
expectations for how GWLs will affect individuals’ views towards 
smoking, suggesting that designers’ expectations may not be a 
sufficient guide to understand how their design decisions will affect 
the users of a system.71 
Other examples abound. Studies of policy interventions 
designed to nudge credit card users to reduce their debt by tweaking 
what information was provided to them in monthly statements 
                                                 
 66 Id. 
 67 CABINET OFFICE, APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TO ORGAN DONATION: 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL 5 (Dec. 23, 
2013) (UK), https://www.bi.team/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Applying_Behavioural 
_Insights_to_Organ_Donation_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7MW-TC33]. 
 68 Pieter Van Dessel et al., Graphic Cigarette Pack Warnings do not Produce 
More Negative Implicit Evaluations of Smoking Compared to Text-only 
Warnings, PLOS ONE (Mar. 15, 2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ 
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0194627 [https://perma.cc/3PHZ-PN8L]. 
 69 Id.; William G. Shadel et al., Do Graphic Health Warning Labels on 
Cigarette Packages Deter Purchases at Point-of-Sale? An Experiment with Adult 
Smokers, 34 HEALTH EDUC. RSCH. 321, 329 (Apr. 1, 2019), https://academic. 
oup.com/her/article/ 34/3/321/5424102 [https://perma.cc/JZ4K-J3KE].  
 70 Van Dessel et al., supra note 68; Minsoo Jung, Implications of Graphic 
Cigarette Warning Labels on Smoking Behavior: An International Perspective, 
21 J. CANCER PREVENTION 22 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC4819662 [https://perma.cc/FE4C-6TPR]. 
 71 Van Dessel, supra note 68. 
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actually increased the amount that already-indebted users 
borrowed.72 Studies of requirements that fast-food restaurants list 
calorie-counts on their menus, as a means of reducing caloric intake, 
have shown at best insignificant effects, and in some cases suggest 
such nudges can actually increase calorie-consumption for many 
lower-income consumers.73 Efforts to reduce energy consumption 
by reporting how homeowners’ energy usage compared to that of 
their neighbors has had a similarly ambiguous effect.74 
To take yet another example, in recent years, many states have 
adopted “ban-the-box” laws that prohibit allowing employers from 
including a question on job applications that asks candidates 
whether they have a criminal record.75 The idea behind these laws is 
to give individuals with criminal records a greater chance at getting 
to the interview stage of a job application—at which they can 
discuss and explain their records—by preventing employers from 
                                                 
 72 See Omri Ben-Shahar, More Failed Nudges: Evidence of Ineffective 
“Behaviorally Informed” Disclosures, J. OF THINGS WE LIKE (LOTS) (Aug. 10, 
2017), https://contracts.jotwell.com/more-failed-nudges-evidence-of-ineffective-
behaviorally-informed-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/N9PX-SX5L].  
 73 Christopher Berry et al., Understanding the Calorie Labeling Paradox in 
Chain Restaurants: Why Menu Calorie Labeling Alone May Not Affect Average 
Calories Ordered, 38 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 192, 195–96 (2019) (discussing 
how quantity value oriented consumers may increase calories ordered based on 
required menu calorie labeling). 
 74 Christophe Charlier et al., Under Pressure! Nudging Electricity Consumption 
within Firms: Feedback from a Field Experiment 3 (Groupe de Recherche en 
Droit, Economie et Gesion, Working Paper No. 2019-18, 2020), https://hal. 
archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02421815/document [https://perma.cc/39WE-495N] (Fr.); 
Laurent Belsie, Peer Comparisons Reduce Residential Energy Use, THE NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH, https://www.nber.org/digest /feb10/w15386.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SZF-WWFP]. 
 75 Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of 
“Ban the Box”: Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When 
Criminal Histories Are Hidden, 38 J. LAB. ECON. 321, 323–24 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1086/705880 [https://perma.cc/NZE6-M5VG] (“When BTB 
removes information about a criminal record from job applications, employers 
may respond by using the remaining observable information to try to guess who 
the ex-offenders are and avoid interviewing them . . . Since young, low-skilled 
black and Hispanic men are the most likely to fall into this category, employers 
may respond to BTB by avoiding interviews with this group.”). 
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filtering them out at a screening stage. The results of this design 
intervention have also been mixed. Many employers, under the 
assumption that younger African American men are more likely to 
have criminal records than other potential employees, appear to be 
screening out all job applications that appear to be from younger 
African American men.76 The result is that, in states that adopt 
ban-the-box laws, fewer African American men get jobs (whether 
or not they have a criminal record) but more non-African American 
men get jobs (even if they do have criminal records).77  
A final example is Braess’s Paradox, which comes from the 
traffic engineering literature.78 Intuitively, if a city’s roads are 
congested, this congestion can be reduced by adding more roads. 
Some of the cars on existing roads will move to the new roads, 
which should reduce the average congestion. But, it turns out, 
designing road networks is more complicated than one would 
intuitively expect. Adding new roads can actually increase 
congestion.79 The reason is that drivers will expect the new roads to 
be less congested than the existing congested roads, so they will all 
abandon the existing roads and attempt to use the new roads 
instead.80 The result of adding a new road, therefore, can be to create 
a tragedy of the commons in which the new road, and roads needed 
to access it, face significantly increased congestion while other, 
lower capacity, roads go largely unused. 
There is a range of mechanisms at play across these examples. 
In some cases, designers may simply not understand how users will 
respond to design cues. In the case of fast-food calorie counts, for 
instance, lower-income consumers, who are working to maximize 
the amount of food they can get per dollar spent, may view these 
counts as a useful way to maximize their caloric intake. In other 
cases, the design cues may be interpreted differently by different 
                                                 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 326. 
 78 See generally Von D. Braess, Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung. 
12 UNTERNEHMENSFORSCHUNG 258, 259 (1968) (Ger.); DAVID EASLEY & JON 
KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY 
CONNECTED WORLD 229, 231–32 (2010) (explaining Braess’s paradox).  
 79 See EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 78, at 232. 
 80 Id. 
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user groups. Such may be the case with cigarette smokers, where 
GWLs serve as a warning for non-smokers but an enticement for 
existing smokers. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in predicting 
outcomes arises where users respond strategically to design 
decision. In the case of ban-the-box laws, employers may devise 
proxies to assess the employability of job applicants that are, in fact, 
worse than the information being withheld from them. Rather than 
respond to the design cue as intended by the designers (that is, by 
interviewing more candidates who may have criminal records), they 
respond strategically by trying to filter out candidates who they 
believe may have criminal records. The example of Braess’s 
Paradox is an even more complicated example of strategic behavior 
in response to design decision. Here, users are not only responding 
to the design decision, but to how they expect other users will 
respond to that decision as well. 
C. . . . it’s Competitive 
Product design is a key margin along which firms compete.81 
Consumers desire products that are “user friendly” and “easy to 
use.” Importantly, “user friendly” and “easy to use” are defined in 
terms of the users, not the product designers. The story of Apple’s 
success is one tale that captures this. Apple’s recent history, and the 
role of design in it, is reasonably well known.82 The iPod, the iMac, 
and the iPhone were all as revolutionary and successful as they were 
largely due to their design. Apple took a streamlined and minimalist 
approach to design, delivering products with simplified interfaces 
designed to operate smoothly and intuitively. This approach served 
Apple and Apple’s customers well, but it is important to note that it 
does not serve all customers well. 
                                                 
 81 Aaron Rasmussen, Software ate the World. Now it’s Design’s Turn, FAST CO. 
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90454781/software-ate-the-
world-now-its-designs-turn [https://perma.cc/4B46-XT7L]. 
 82 For a recent account, focusing on the recent departure of Apple’s longtime 
chief of design Jony Ive, see Chris Welch, Jony Ive Leaving Apple After Nearly 
30 Years to Start New Design Firm, THE VERGE (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/27/18761736/jony-ive-apple-leave-iphone-
chief-design-officer-lovefrom-company-quit [https://perma.cc/TTP5-D7ST]. 
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Apple’s history, however, goes back far before the iPod. The 
introduction of the original Macintosh computer in 1984 was 
arguably even more revolutionary. It marked a transition in 
computer design from computers that were designed for computer 
engineers to computers that were designed for ordinary users. It 
could be used by anyone without specialized training. It included 
basic applications that did most of the things that ordinary users 
wanted, in ways that most of them understood: simple word 
processing, simple graphics editing, simple file management, and a 
simple graphical interface. 
But this simplicity––both from the Macintosh era and the iPod 
era––comes at a cost. Apple products are exceptionally good at 
doing what they are designed to do, but part of creating such 
products is “locking them down.” They can be relatively difficult to 
customize or to configure for applications unanticipated by Apple’s 
design. The result is that some users rather dislike Apple products. 
The competition for the personal computer in the 1980s was largely 
between locked-down architectures like Apple’s and open 
architectures like the IBM compatible PC. The competition on 
mobile devices today is largely between the closed-platform iPhone 
and open-platform Android devices. 
To take but one recent example, most modern computers are 
designed to operate in various high- and lower-power modes. 
High-power modes may drain batteries, generate lots of heat, and 
require the use of noisy fans. Lower-power modes may slow down 
system performance and leave computers feeling sluggish and 
nonresponsive. Apple has historically designed its computers so that 
they will not feel sluggish, even if this causes reduced battery life or 
the need to run fans to cool down the computer’s internal 
components.83 Users are not able to override these settings––for 
                                                 
 83 Marco Arment, Low Power Mode for Mac Laptops: Making the Case Again, 
MARCO.ORG (Jan. 13, 2020) https://marco.org/2020/01/13/macos-low-power-
mode-redux [https://perma.cc/MCU8-A4J7] (explaining that “[m]odern 
[computer] hardware constantly pushes thermal and power limits, trying to strike 
a balance that minimizes noise and heat while maximizing performance and 
battery life,” but that “Apple’s customers don’t usually have control over these 
balances, and they’re usually fixed at design time,” and “Mac laptops need Low 
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instance, a user who wants to slow down the computer in order to 
maintain battery life is not able to do this on most Apple computers. 
PC users, on the other hand, have significant control over their 
computers’ power consumption. The result is that it is harder to 
properly configure a PC, and its performance may more likely not 
be satisfactory to the user, but when the user does want to alter that 
performance, they are able to do so.84 These design considerations 
echo the discussions above that product design is complicated and 
unpredictable––they also demonstrate the competitive nature of 
design decisions. Apple differentiates its products by making them 
easier to use and ensuring that they always run smoothly, which 
comes at the cost of users potentially having less control and poorer 
battery life when needed. PCs, on the other hand, offer less 
convenience but greater control. Consumers are better served by a 
market that gives them both options––particularly because no 
product exists that offers both the simple interface of an Apple 
computer but the configurability of a PC. Indeed, it may not be 
possible for such a product to exist. 
Neither of these approaches is necessarily better or worse than 
the other. To the contrary, these design elements define how the 
platforms compete. Apple provides a more consistent, uniform, and 
in some ways limited, set of product features, and affords greater 
integration across its ecosystem of products. Android and PCs are 
less consistent, but support a wider range of hardware and 
applications, and generally require more complicated tools for 
cross-device integration. Different users prefer differently designed 
systems. The fact that there are multiple, different, competing 
designs makes all users better off. 
It is also important to consider the development process that is 
popular among technology producers. Given the complexity of 
design, the initial version of new products rarely supports a full 
range of features, platforms, and users. It is prohibitively expensive 
to develop fully-featured software in an initial release, particularly 
given the high failure rate of new products. Rather, firms develop an 
                                                 
Power Mode,” which allows users “to greatly extend their battery life when they 
know they’ll need it.”). 
 84 Id. 
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initial release targeting a specific cohort for entry—perhaps a 
hypothetical typical customer, or perhaps a specific type of customer 
that the firm thinks is suitable to target for the product’s initial 
launch. Once the product has achieved a minimum successful 
launch, the design can be incrementally modified to support wider 
or more specific user bases. 
This model of software design has distinct benefits. It enables 
rapid delivery of new goods and services to market, and it enables 
competition from smaller firms. Introducing requirements that a 
design must be “complete” before release––however that is 
determined––would make entry difficult or impossible for many 
potential entrepreneurs. Further, even the products of medium and 
large firms would be negatively affected by requiring completed 
designs. The rapid prototyping process works the same for both 
small and large firms. 
In the context of dark patterns, these observations urge two types 
of caution. First, what may appear to be a “dark pattern” may merely 
be a design artifact. A product may have been designed for one user 
cohort or for one interface and may currently be used by other users 
or on other devices. The default settings for an initial user base may 
not be the same as may be expected for the expanded user base, and 
it may appear that the platform is designed to push users into 
disadvantageous decisions. Or, an interface that was designed, for 
instance, to run on desktop or laptop computers, may be awkward to 
use on a mobile device in ways that, again, seem to be 
intentionally-designed dark patterns. On the other side of this coin, 
requiring firms to “completely” design systems prior to launching 
them is, at best, a burden that is detrimental to competition and, at 
worst, impossible. Such a requirement would dramatically increase 
the cost of developing new products and bringing them to market, 
disproportionately hampering smaller competitors. And it would 
make these firms liable for unanticipated uses of their products. 
A better approach to addressing concerns like this is to rely on 
competition. Customers are generally keenly aware of design issues. 
There is little better way to drive customers away from a product 
than for it to have an awkward, cumbersome, or “unfriendly” 
interface. Where firms are able to compete, and especially where 
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there is evidence that firms compete, regulation over design 
elements or design decisions is likely undesirable except in the rarest 
cases of overtly intentional or exceptionally harmful design patterns. 
V. PATTERNS OF REGULATING DESIGN 
None of the discussion above is meant to argue that dark patterns 
may not be used in problematic ways––or that they are, in fact, being 
used in problematic ways. There is, without a doubt, plenty of bad 
conduct happening, both online and off. Industry behavior in this 
regard is frequently disappointing. The question becomes what 
should be done about bad conduct, particularly given the difficulties 
of distinguishing between good and bad design practices, the 
potential for competitive pressures to address some of these 
concerns, and the danger of poor regulation exacerbating already 
difficult design challenges. The solution is made even more 
complicated in the online setting where so many parts of the 
ecosystem continue to change. To the extent industry standards and 
self-regulation presents viable solutions to these concerns, such 
mechanisms are yet in their infancy. Given time, such mechanisms 
may address many of the concerns of dark patterns––or they may 
not. 
In other words, the point of the above is that regulators need to 
be careful in how and why they regulate these practices, including 
understanding when and whether they should at all. In some cases, 
regulatory efforts may be better focused on other areas. In some 
cases, it may make more sense to allow the underlying technology 
and markets to continue to improve before stepping in with 
regulatory intervention. In other cases, still, beneficial regulatory 
intervention may simply not be possible. 
A. Assessing the Problem 
There is little empirical evidence about the extent of the dark 
patterns as a problem––meaning both the incidence of use of dark 
patterns, the effectiveness of those patterns, and ultimately, the 
extent to which use of these patterns actually harms consumers. The 
literature cited above, such as recent studies showing that various 
dark patterns are being used on shopping websites and that these 
patterns can be effective at increasing the likelihood of consumers 
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taking actions that they otherwise would not, are compelling 
evidence that there is reason to be concerned.85 But demonstrating 
that something may be a problem is not the same as demonstrating 
that it is, in fact, a problem. As discussed above, the literature on 
using nudges to control user behavior demonstrates that the effects 
of such tools are unpredictable.86 
Indeed, there is evidence that tools such as dark patterns are most 
likely to be effective where their potential harms are least, and least 
likely to be effective when their potential harms are significant. 
Behavioral psychology literature studying the effects of disclosure 
rules in high-stakes transactions, such as home mortgages, have 
found that regulation of disclosures––effectively the design of how 
and what information is presented to consumer borrowers––have 
little to no effect on borrowing behavior.87 The paradox illustrated 
by that literature raises questions about whether regulation of dark 
patterns is justified. If the effect is only limited to low-value 
transactions, the impact on consumers may not be sufficient to 
justify regulation that may or may not prove effective. Accordingly, 
if the concern is that firms use dark patterns to extract small, 
additional revenue from a large number of consumers that may be 
particularly at-risk of exploitation, caution may be particularly 
warranted. Increasing regulatory compliance costs on these firms 
could result in the firms leaving markets entirely, and leaving those 
consumers entirely unserved, rather than incurring compliance costs 
and facing potential enforcement actions if they do not comply 
correctly. In an imperfect world, regulations must accordingly be 
                                                 
 85 See Mathur et al., supra note 3 (presenting data showing widespread use of 
some categories of dark patterns on shopping websites); see generally Luguri & 
Strahievitz, supra note 31 (showing that dark patterns can be effectively used in 
some cases to manipulate user behaviour). 
 86 See Thaler, supra note 2; see also Luguri & Strahievitz, supra note 31, at 37–
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 87 See, e.g., Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage 
Credit Regulation (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harv. Univ., Working Paper, Paper 
No. UCC08-12, 2009), https:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121199 
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judged by their likely real-world effects, not against a world of 
costless and perfectly effective regulation.88 
It is also unclear how much of this behavior is fraudulent or 
deceptive, and how much of it is simply advertising by another 
name. Calling a shopper’s attention to a complementary product 
during a checkout flow could be called trickery, but it is not clear 
how it is materially different than showing the user an advertisement 
they need to dismiss when they land on the site’s home page. On the 
other hand, practices like cramming, slamming, and “sneaking into 
cart” are much more likely to be harmful because the transaction 
costs of returning or cancelling unwanted items may exceed the 
value that the firm extracts from the consumer, leading the consumer 
to move on with their day and take the loss. 
Research on the effects of dark patterns on consumers is still in 
its infancy. There is not enough research today to justify any broad 
regulatory undertakings that would not incur substantial risk of 
unintended consequences. In all likelihood, the best regulatory 
approach––to the extent that one proves to be justified––will be one 
that is tailored to specific types of patterns. Such regulation could, 
for instance, make specific design practices (e.g., providing 
fraudulent information to consumers at or near the time of purchase) 
illegal, or could, alternatively, task or empower an agency such as 
the FTC to identify specific practices as violations of the FTC Act. 
B. The Marketplace is Working to Address These Problems 
Even as some firms take advantage of dark patterns, other firms 
are voluntarily working to protect consumers from them. As 
discussed above, design is a key margin along which firms 
compete.89 It is arguably among the most important margins. 
Google, for instance, banned advertisers from its network that used 
pop-under ads, which it viewed as a poor design pattern providing a 
                                                 
 88 Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. OF L. 
& ECON. 1, 1–2 (1969) (elaborating on the “Nirvana Fallacy,” comparing the ideal 
scenario as more efficient than the real choices presented). 
 89 Supra, Part IV.C. 
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bad user experience.90 Most major browsers now allow users to 
automatically block pop-up windows—another design practice 
designed to draw users’ attention similar to windows that cannot 
easily be closed. Malware and spyware frequently attempt to take 
over a user’s web browsing experience via browser hijacking—the 
installation of a software add-on that would permit third parties to 
interfere with and observe the web browsing of a user. As of 
Windows 10, Microsoft had disabled the key behavior of web 
browsers that facilitated browser hijacking. 
These are all examples of platform-level efforts that combat 
these practices by disabling features needed to implement designs 
that are particularly likely to be harmful to users. There is also effort 
among industry professionals to combat the use by designers of dark 
pattern techniques. For instance, at the time of this writing 
twenty-seven of the first thirty results from a search for the term 
“dark patterns” on Google demonstrate a widespread understanding 
and condemnation of using dark patterns to trick users.91 These 
search results show that designers are warning peers not to use these 
and similar tactics and, where the practice may have value they offer 
alternative design tools. The remaining three search results link to 
more general discussions of dark patterns––these discussions all 
also describe use of the approach as problematic. 
Given the complexity of design, there is reason to prefer to rely 
on the marketplace to address the concerns raised by dark patterns— 
particularly given that this market-based approach appears to be 
working. Some patterns that seem to be, or even in fact are, being 
used in ways that are problematic may also have good uses. For 
instance, pop-up windows are often used in problematic ways, but 
some websites make good use of them. Rather than prohibit them 
entirely, modern web browsers indicate to users when a website has 
tried to use a pop-up window and empower users to allow them on 
a case-by-case basis, for specific websites, or generally. Regulation 
                                                 
 90 See Sarah Perez, Google Bans its Ads on Sites that use Those Annoying ‘Pop-
unders,’ TECHCRUNCH (July 11, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/11/ 
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91 A copy of these search results is on file with UNC Journal of Law and 
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is unlikely to implement a similarly nuanced approach. Features 
empowering users to control the behavior of pop-up windows was 
phased in over time and across a range of browser platforms, 
allowing for industry to experiment and gather data on how best to 
implement this feature. Moreover, it is also notable that this feature 
was implemented at the browser (platform) level. Regulation of 
design features can be undertaken at various levels in the software 
stack. The use and behavior of pop-up windows, for instance, could 
be controlled by the web browser. The operating system could also 
limit the ability of the browser to open new windows. Code that 
opens new windows could be intercepted by firewalls. Finally, of 
course pop-up windows can only be implemented if the 
programming languages for writing web pages implement them. To 
which of these layers should regulation of design patterns apply? 
How does this choice affect the overall complexity of the design 
ecosystem? 
Indeed, even aside from this problem, there is a great deal of 
value in maintaining stable interfaces, even where those interfaces 
may contain some poor design. Frequent design change is itself a 
dark pattern, or deviation from established design elements. 
Consumers are more likely to make mistakes––or to be tricked into 
doing things they would not otherwise do––if they are unfamiliar 
with a design or an interface.92 Regulatory intervention into design 
could force widespread redesign of interfaces, especially if 
undertaken regularly or in a way that lacks the precision of changes 
that industry itself may be able to make. This mass-redesign, in turn, 
                                                 
 92 See, e.g., ROWLAND ET AL., supra note 64, at 360 (“Users should not have to 
wonder whether different words, situations, or actions mean the same thing. 
Follow platform conventions.”) (citation omitted); Euphemia Wong, Principles of 
Consistency and Standards in User Interface Design, INTERACTION DESIGN 
FOUND. (Aug. 2020) https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/principle -of-
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(discussing the reasons for consistent design). But see Priscilla Esser, How to Get 
Users’ Agreement with the Opt-in/Opt-out Dance, INTERACTION DESIGN FOUND. 
(Aug. 2020), https://www. interaction-design.org/literature/article/how-to-get-
users-agreement-with-the-opt-in-opt-out-dance [https://perma.cc/XY82-KFXX] 
(discussing the use of inconsistent design as a dark pattern, explaining that “[b]y 
being purposefully inconsistent, the designers [create a situation that] is intended 
to trick users.”). 
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could have widespread adverse effects on consumers. Again, this is 
not to say that regulation is unwarranted or not possible—only that 
it must be undertaken with care and with due consideration of 
alternatives such as industry standardization (which would increase 
stability, both over time and across websites) and self-regulation. 
C. The Sufficiency of Existing Law 
Existing law is sufficient to address many, possibly most, of the 
concerns raised by dark patterns. Most of the egregious dark patterns 
should fall within the ambit of the FTC’s consumer protection 
authority. To the extent that they are harmful, most of these patterns 
involve making representations or engaging in practices that are 
designed to deceive consumers. Such conduct is covered by Section 
5 of the FTC Act’s prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices.93 In order to make out such a claim, the FTC Act, and the 
FTC’s subsequently adopted Policy Statement on Deception,94 
require that the Commission must establish that the practice is likely 
to mislead the ordinary, reasonable consumer in a way that is 
material, causing injury to that consumer.95 The Commission 
“presume[s] that express claims are material.”96 Thus, the 
Commission needs only to demonstrate injury—i.e., that a 
reasonable consumer did, in fact, make purchases that they 
otherwise would not have—to take action against firms employing 
design practices (dark patterns), such as falsely asserting that a 
certain number of people have recently purchased a product or that 
a specific limited number of units remain available for sale. Other 
practices, such as obscuring how to close a window, may require 
that a more substantial evidentiary burden be met by the 
Commission. 
                                                 
 93 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
 94 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (1983), 
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Should the FTC decide to act against firms making use of dark 
patterns, there are several approaches that it could take. In general, 
like most regulatory agencies, the FTC has both adjudicative and 
rulemaking authorities, as provided for under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”)97 —though its rulemaking authority has 
been modified by the Magnusson-Moss Act and is more involved 
than the traditional APA rulemaking procedures.98 In general, the 
Commission may bring an administrative enforcement action to 
enjoin any conduct that the Commission determines violates Section 
5, after an investigation and administrative hearing.99 It may also 
seek damages for such action in federal court for conduct that “a 
reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was 
dishonest or fraudulent.”100 It may also issue rules that “define with 
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”101 Once enacted, it can enforce 
such rules through administrative action or directly in federal court, 
seeking both injunctive relief or damages.102 
In recent decades, the FTC has been reluctant to engage in 
rulemaking proceedings, due largely to misunderstandings of both 
the FTC Act and general administrative law dating back to important 
judicial losses in the 1980s––however, this does not mean that it 
lacks such authority.103 Given the broad, and generally unexplored, 
                                                 
 97 See 5 U.S.C. § 500. 
 98 See 15 U.S.C. § 57a. These procedures were amended in 1975 by the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 
1975, Pub. L. 93-637 to facilitate heightened Congressional oversight of FTC 
rules relative to ordinary rulemaking procedures under the APA. 
 99 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
 100 Id. § 57b(a)(2). 
 101 Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B). 
 102 Id. §§ 45(b), 57b(a)(1). 
 103 See generally, Justin Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of Administrative 
Antitrust, 76 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 209, 239 (2014) (noting that high-profile losses 
in federal circuit courts contributed to decreased FTC rulemaking); see also Fed. 
Trade Comm’r Rohit Chopra, Comment of Federal Trade Commissioner Rohit 
Chopra: Hearing #1 on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century 
8 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
1408196/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf [https:// perma.cc/6FUD-
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depth of the FTC’s authority directly relevant to the practice of dark 
patterns, it would be preferable for the FTC to take the lead in 
developing rules relating to regulation of dark patterns. It only 
makes sense for legislative approaches to be explored should the 
FTC’s authority prove insufficient to the task. 
It also bears noting that, in addition to authority that the FTC 
has, it is established law that consent obtained through material 
deception is not valid.104 Many dark patterns exploit the boundaries 
of consent. But this issue is broader than the issue of dark patterns, 
relating, for instance, to contracts of adhesion, the process of 
contract formation in the online setting, and the enforceability of 
contracts that are generally known to go unread. These are topics of 
significant and ongoing (arguably endless) discussion—to the extent 
that legislative attention should be given to this issue, it should focus 
on the validity of consent, not on the sub-issue of dark patterns. 
On the other side of the regulatory equation is concern that some 
efforts to regulate dark patterns may run headlong into the First 
Amendment.105 The threshold question is whether design decisions 
constitute expression protected by the First Amendment. There is 
ample reason to believe that regulation of interface design could 
trigger First Amendment scrutiny, at least in some cases. The most 
                                                 
CFMN] (observing that the FTC has “largely neglected” its rulemaking 
capabilities). 
 104 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B (A.L.I. 1979) (discussing cases 
where courts held consent procured through fraudulent means invalid); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 163 (A.L.I. 1981) (discussing cases where 
fraudulent inducement allowed the rescission of contracts).  
 105 See, e.g., Mark MacCarthy, Online Manipulation is the Latest Data 
Protection, CIO (Aug. 14, 2018) https://www.cio.com/article/3297536/online-
manipulation-is-the-latest-data-protection-debate.html [https://perma.cc/KF4L-
KHDG] (arguing that “calls for prohibition [of dark patterns] might threaten 
activities protected by the First Amendment”); see also VALERIE C. BRANNON, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10309, REGULATING BIG TECH: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 4 
(2019) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10309.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SBK-
FGSP] (discussing various regulatory proposals relating to “big tech,” including 
the DETOUR Act, and noting that “[a]ny of the general proposals discussed in 
this Sidebar could raise First Amendment concerns, depending on the precise 
contours of a given regulation.”). 
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poignant case is likely Reed v. Town of Gilbert,106 in which the 
Supreme Court found a city’s “sign code” to be a content-based 
regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny.107 “Sign 
codes” are laws that regulate the use, placement, and design of 
signs—such as the temporary signs placed along streets announcing 
the opening and location of a new church.108 To use the facts of Reed 
as an example, sign codes are a physical-world analogy to a 
hypothetical law purporting to regulate the use, placement, or other 
design elements of a computer interface. 
The application of Reed in the context of dark patterns should 
not be over-stated. Reed does not say that all design is speech, that 
it is necessarily subject to strict scrutiny, or that it necessarily cannot 
be regulated. The sign code at issue in Reed applied differently to 
different users of those signs, such that the Court found it was 
regulating the speech of different speakers differently.109 A more 
general, content-neutral, regulation would likely not face strict 
scrutiny—though it may face intermediate scrutiny. Moreover, 
while the case clearly demonstrates that regulation of some design 
elements or decisions may constitute speech, this does not mean that 
all design elements are speech, nor does it provide clear guidance on 
when they do. Rather, in Reed the Court focuses on the fact of the 
signs’ “communicative content” to determine that the sign code 
made content-based distinctions.110 To the extent that design 
elements lack communicative content, they are more likely to fall 
outside the scope of First Amendment protections. 
But the concern also should not be minimized. Most concerns 
about dark patterns arise in the commercial context—where the 
concern is, in effect, that firms are using design elements to 
influence decisions about whether and what to purchase. The 
Supreme Court’s treatment of commercial speech has become 
controversial and confused in recent years, following both Reed and 
                                                 
106 576 U.S. 155 (2015). 
 107 Id. at 159. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 164. 
 110 Id. at 163. 
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the earlier Sorrell case.111 Whereas commercial speech has long been 
understood to face less Constitutional protection than most other 
forms of speech,112 recent cases like Sorrell and Reed suggest that 
regulations that subject commercial speech to distinct rules make 
content-based distinctions and are therefore subject to “heightened 
scrutiny.”113 Prior to these cases, the longstanding understanding 
was that commercial speech, which would likely include decisions 
about design elements of commercial products, to the extent that 
they constitute speech at all, were subject to the most modest of First 
Amendment protections.114 
The purpose of this argument is not to say that design decisions 
necessarily constitute speech or that regulation of those decisions 
necessarily implicates First Amendment concerns or review. There 
are ample examples of laws that regulate aspects of design that have 
survived First Amendment challenges—or that simply are 
longstanding regulations which have not been challenged as raising 
First Amendment concerns. Food and drug labels are highly 
regulated, as is disclosure of various financial information by banks 
and lenders. Fuel economy information is regulated. Different types 
of vehicles are required to bear different types of information 
disclosures. States often regulate how prices are disclosed. 
Additionally, of course, it is illegal to sell mattresses as new without 
a standardized tag. 
In light of cases like Sorrell and Reed, the delineation between 
design regulations that do and do not implicate First Amendment 
                                                 
 111 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 112 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 
U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980). 
 113 The Court in Sorrell applies what it calls “heightened scrutiny,” which is not 
clearly the same as the Court’s more traditional standards of either intermediate 
or strict scrutiny. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557, 565, 566. For discussion of the Court’s 
evolving understanding of commercial speech, see Amanda Shanor, The New 
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 178 (2016); see also Caitlin E. Jokubaitis, There 
and Back: Vindicating the Listener’s Interests in Targeted Advertising in the 
Internet Information Economy, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 85, 95 (2018); Thomas 
A. Zelante, Jr., Paper or Plastic: Speech in an Unlikely Place, 48 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 931, 932 (2018). 
 114 That is, the commercial speech standard established under Central Hudson, 
447 U.S. 557. 
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concerns is unclear. Any attempt to regulate design decisions should 
be undertaken with awareness that such regulations could raise such 
concerns. 
Importantly, in cases where the First Amendment does apply, 
regulations of purported dark patterns could well face trouble—even 
under the more forgiving standards of intermediate scrutiny. As 
discussed in Part II, design is hard to do well and the effects of 
design decisions can be hard to predict. Assuming the courts find 
that regulators have a sufficiently important interest in regulating 
design decisions, it may be difficult to demonstrate that those 
regulations are not either underinclusive or overinclusive, let alone 
that they are sufficiently tailored to address the underlying interest 
justifying the regulation.115 A regulation that encumbers protected 
speech, while failing to curtail the speech that the government has a 
sufficient interest in restraining, is very likely to be struck down by 
the courts. Courts are particularly likely to rule against regulations 
when there are less restrictive means of addressing those concerns, 
such as relying on market forces that appear to be responsive to 
those same concerns.116 
D. Better Approaches than Regulation: New Technologies and 
Self-Regulation 
To the extent that existing legal rules are insufficient to address 
harms from dark patterns, it is likely either because the conduct is 
not clearly harmful or those patterns may at times be beneficial. If 
such is the case, the conduct likely should not be prohibited. 
Nonetheless, dark patterns are a reasonable area of legislative 
concern where regulation, either today or in the future, may be 
warranted. 
Should regulation be desired, a few ideas to keep in mind when 
approaching regulation in the area of dark patterns are discussed 
below. Importantly, many of these ideas are intended to only 
                                                 
 115 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF LAWYER ADVERTISING § 2:4 (2019) 
(explaining that the government must “demonstrate ‘important’ or ‘substantial’ 
justifications for its actions and . . . a ‘substantial nexus’ or a ‘narrow tailoring’ of 
ends to means”). 
 116 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the competitive market forces that govern 
design decisions). 
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regulate patterns indirectly, or by enabling new ways that users may 
identify, avoid, or respond to potentially harmful design practices. 
Dark patterns are well-suited to industry self-regulation, where 
standardized industry practices are given some presumption of being 
inoffensive, but entities deviating from those practices bear a burden 
of demonstrating that their design choices are in the interest of 
consumers. Importantly, and contrary to the understanding 
demonstrated by some members of the House Subcommittee, 
industry self-regulation emphatically does not mean non-regulation. 
Self-regulation carries with it an expectation that an industry will, in 
fact, endeavor to limit harmful conduct. Specifically, this includes 
an expectation that the industry will take action against industry 
participants who eschew the norms of the industry, and that industry 
will expect regulators to take action against it if it fails to do so. Both 
categories of sanction may be formal or informal, and may be 
internally or externally imposed. At the least formal end of the 
spectrum, an industry’s customary practices may be considered by 
courts as persuasive evidence of the appropriateness of a member of 
that industry’s conduct. If interface designers have standard 
practices, and particularly if they have a presumption against the use 
of certain patterns, this is compelling evidence for a court to 
consider. More formally, many industries and professions have 
formal self-governance bodies, such as medical licensing boards or 
financial oversight entities. Participation in the industry requires 
membership in one of these bodies, and the bodies are expected to 
police the conduct of their members. 
As discussed above, industry is, and has consistently been, 
working to improve the status quo and deter the use of pernicious 
dark patterns.117 The most viable approach would likely be to allow 
firms to use contemporaneous documentation––that is, 
documentation supporting design decisions at the time those 
decisions were made––to demonstrate that design decisions were 
made with the interest of consumers and users in mind. Such a factor 
could be influential both for the development of standardized 
industry practices as well as for firms that deviate from those 
practices, by placing an expressly consumer-focused research and 
                                                 
 117 See Thaler, supra note 2; see also Luguri & Strahievitz, supra note 31, at 37–38.  
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development element at the heart of the design practice. Such 
documentation would tend to suggest that pro-consumer 
justifications exist for design decisions. Moreover, to the extent that 
designers are not concerned with consumer experience today––such 
as if they are focused more narrowly on designs that are appealing 
on technological or aesthetic grounds but that may, in fact, be 
detrimental to the user experience of products––it would create a 
strong incentive for designers and industry groups to focus expressly 
on the effects of design decisions on consumers. 
If it proves to be the case that the FTC is unable to act against 
specific design practices that it believes to be harmful to consumers, 
it still has multiple paths of response. First, it could engage in a 
rulemaking proceeding to develop rules to proscribe specific 
practices. Its authority in this area is broad, if not often used. 
Alternatively, it could report to Congress on these issues to seek 
statutory authorization to address specific practices. Indeed, dark 
patterns may be an area well-suited to the development of an 
expedited review and rulemaking process, such as that developed in 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) for the review of 
circumvention technologies.118 For instance, the FTC could be 
tasked with periodically reporting to Congress on practices that it  
sees that have the potential to harm consumers but fall outside of its 
existing statutory authority. Or it could be tasked by Congress with 
producing a periodic study on specific problematic practices, 
including the establishment of a mechanism for reporting practices 
to be investigated. This could be used to support injunctive or other 
enforcement actions against firms engaging in those practices. 
Ideas such as these would bolster the FTC’s authority in this area 
without need for the enactment of a substantial new regulatory 
regime or enactment of ossifying laws. In general, the FTC should 
be encouraged to explore the limits of its authority to address these 
concerns, including through narrow legislative interventions such as 
discussed above, or through FTC-generated reports on these issues, 
before implementing new, congressionally-crafted, regulatory 
regimes. Importantly, administrative remedies should be limited to 
injunctions, with civil penalties only available through the federal 
                                                 
 118 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). 
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courts. And, except in a case of clearly intentional fraudulent 
behavior––such as what would already be covered under existing 
Section 5 authority––the preferred initial remedy should be for firms 
to forego the problematic conduct in order to improve the overall 
standard of conduct of the industry in a non-adversarial manner. 
More generally, regulators should focus greater attention on the 
causes of problematic practices rather than on the reasons that those 
practices are concerning. Understanding why certain practices are 
harmful may allow for the identification of new ways to mitigate 
that harm. It may often be the case that it is preferable to enable new 
forms of conduct that allow consumers and users to mitigate harm 
than to try to prohibit the existing, potentially harmful, conduct 
directly. Where the effects of design decisions may be ambiguous, 
benefiting some users while potentially harming others, regulations 
that focus on allowing users to mitigate harm, rather than prohibiting 
that harm outright may be more suitable. 
To the extent the law proscribes certain designs, it must do so 
carefully, including thinking about what alternative designs may be 
adopted––both legitimate and illegitimate ones. As discussed above, 
design is hard119 ––these are complex systems––and any regulation 
puts regulators in the shoes of the designers. What is more, it ossifies 
design. 
Finally, given that many dark patterns are used both online and 
offline, and more generally that the concerns created by dark 
patterns are not unique to the online setting, Congress should 
consider whether the scope of its interest in this area should be 
limited to the online setting. For instance, many firms engage in 
practices that make it difficult to cancel service or return products. 
To the extent that concern is justified about analogous online 
practices, it does not make sense to cabin that concern––or any 
exploration of it through reports or regulation––to the online setting. 
If new rules are adopted, regulators should consider whether any 
proscribed practices should be limited to online actors or whether 
there should be rules of more general applicability. 
                                                 
 119 See supra Part IV.C. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Concern about “dark patterns” is old wine in new bottles. 
However, it is a good vintage of concern: many practices decried as 
dark patterns are easy analogs of long proscribed business practices. 
Moreover, even those that are not clearly the online equivalents of 
already-proscribed offline conduct are, if harmful to consumers, 
very likely to fall within the FTC’s existing statutory authority to act 
against Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices. Congress should 
push the FTC to use its existing authority to protect consumers 
against these harms before undertaking any novel legislative 
experiments. Should the FTC’s authority prove insufficient, its 
efforts in discovering this will provide valuable information for any 
subsequent legislative efforts––and those efforts will, in all 
likelihood, be best focused on augmenting the FTC’s existing 
authority to cover this area of concern. 
This cautious approach is advisable on simple prudential 
grounds. Congress should turn first to existing statutory authority 
before overlying new, potentially conflicting or confusing, layers to 
the regulatory fabric. But it is especially advisable in the context of 
dark patterns because there is nothing inherently “dark” about these 
practices. As discussed throughout this Article, the reality of design 
is that it is hard to do well and the effects of simple design decisions 
can be complex and difficult to predict. Patterns that are “dark” for 
some users may be beneficial for others. Patterns that appear “dark” 
to casual observers may actually have few or no adverse effects at 
all. And mandating alternative designs may, in fact, yield 
substantially worse effects for many users.  
It is undeniably the case that many firms are using interface 
design for questionable or harmful purposes. It has been empirically 
demonstrated both that firms are engaging in these practices and that 
these practices can affect user decision-making. But, this reality 
alone does not demand legislative or regulatory innovation in 
response. On one hand, almost all of the documented practices that 
are clearly problematic can also clearly be addressed by the FTC 
using its existing authority. And on the other hand, there is reason 
to believe that the market is an effective check on these practices. 
Design is one of the chief margins along which firms compete 
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online, and design professionals clearly view the sort of practices 
animating concern about dark patterns with disdain and 
disapprobation. 
The design of Congress leads to patterns in how it approaches 
and responds to concerns such as those raised by dark patterns––and 
those patterns of Congressional response can themselves be dark, 
having adverse effects for consumers. Just as Congress should be 
concerned about circumstances where information or choices are 
presented to users in ways that influence them into adverse 
decisions, so too should Congress be concerned that it also may be 
influenced into insufficiently considered regulatory decisions. There 
is no lack of attention to the concern of dark patterns today. It is a 
topic of active academic research, regulatory scrutiny, and 
legislative appeal. It is an area of uncertain harm to consumers and 
where regulatory intervention may have adverse consequences for 
consumers. Lastly, it is an area where substantial, yet unexplored, 
regulatory authority already exists.  
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